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Abstract
Inequalities in children’s learning are widely recognized to arise from variations 
in both household and school-related factors. While few studies have considered the 
role of sorting between schools and households, even fewer have quantified how much 
sorting contributes to educational inequalities in low- and middle-income countries. 
We fill this gap using data on over 1 million children from three East African countries. 
Applying a novel variance decomposition procedure, our results indicate that sorting 
of pupils across schools accounts for at least 8 percent of the total test-score variance, 
equivalent to half a year of schooling or more. This contribution tends to be largest 
for children from families at the ends of the socio-economic spectrum. Empirical 
simulations of steady-state educational inequalities reveal that policies to mitigate the 
consequences of sorting could substantially reduce inequalities in education.
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1 Introduction
Education plays a vital role in building human capital, helping individuals make productive
contributions to the economy and live fulfilled lives. The international community has
recently issued a joint call for all children to have access to free and equitable education
through the secondary level by 2030. To achieve this ambitious goal, it is useful to have
a better understanding of the complex processes that determine educational achievement,
thereby permitting more effective policies to reduce educational inequalities.
A vast literature attests that both household and school factors are key determinants of
educational achievement (e.g., Bowles, 1970; Björklund and Salvanes, 2011; Hanushek and
Rivkin, 2012). Thus, unequal learning opportunities at either home or school can contribute
to inequalities in final educational achievement. Moreover, home and school are unlikely
to be independent. Both theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that children from
disadvantaged families disproportionately attend lower-quality schools (Nechyba, 2006;
Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006). Also, substantial evidence indicates that teachers serving schools
in socio-economically deprived areas tend to be less experienced or less qualified, potentially
limiting learning outcomes (Jackson, 2009; Clotfelter et al., 2011; Sass et al., 2012; OECD,
2018). Therefore, sorting between households and schools may accentuate educational
inequalities. Consequently, policies to mitigate sorting may help narrow educational gaps
between rich and poor households.
The vast bulk of evidence regarding educational sorting comes from high-income countries.
However, in these contexts the significance of these processes remains unsettled. Kremer
(1997) argues that eliminating neighbourhood segregation would decrease long-run educa-
tional inequality in the USA by less than two percent. In contrast, Fernández and Rogerson
(2001) develop a model where enhanced sorting can have much larger effects on inequality
(see also Fernandez, 2003); also, empirical evidence from Canada suggests that elimination
of sorting either by home language or by parental schooling could reduce test-score variance
as much as 40 percent in some subjects, at least in locations where school segregation is
substantial (Friesen and Krauth, 2007).
To our knowledge, hardly any study has sought to quantify the contribution of sorting to
educational inequalities in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). But this is not
because educational outcomes are highly equal. In fact, large achievement gaps running
along socio-economic lines among pupils within LMICs have been extensively documented
(e.g., Watkins, 2012). Also, (low cost) private schools have expanded rapidly in many
LMICs over recent decades, increasing possibilities for school choice (Heyneman and
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Stern, 2014). To fill the gap in the literature, we show how estimates of the variance
contribution of sorting can be derived on the basis of separate estimates of the lower-bound
contributions of household and school factors. We present and apply this approach to a
large-scale database of test-scores covering over 1,000,000 school-aged children from three
East African countries (Kenya, mainland Tanzania and Uganda). Not only do we find a
relatively high degree of segregation along socio-economic lines across communities, but
we also find the contribution of sorting of children across schools within communities is
positive and accounts for around 8 percent of the total test-score variance. As such, almost
a fifth of the joint variation in test-scores due to systematic supra-individual circumstances –
i.e., due to schools, communities, and households – can be attributed to sorting. Since these
circumstances relate closely to the notion of inequality of opportunities (Roemer, 2002), it
follows that processes of sorting do have a material role in this domain. Further analysis of
heterogeneity suggests that the same sorting contribution tends to be larger among families
at both the top and bottom ends of the socio-economic distribution and among those sending
their children to private schools, as well as in specific locations.
To explore the long-run implications of these results, we simulate how educational inequality
evolves over time. These simulations show that for the average district in the region, the
steady-state level of educational inequality would fall by around 10 percent if sorting were
to be fully eliminated. While, this may not seem large at first glance, we show this is roughly
equivalent to a 15 percent decline in the magnitude of the intergenerational persistence of
education. Moreover, in a material number of districts, the reduction in inequality from
eliminating sorting would be over 20 percent of the total variance and over 40 percent
of inequality of opportunities. As such, this suggests that policies that take sorting into
account, and even actively counteract it, merit attention.
The paper consists of six sections. In the next section, we outline a simple conceptual
framework that guides our discussion of educational inequalities and points to the primitive
components of the corresponding test-score variance decomposition. In Section 3, we show
how these primitives can be estimated using standard econometric techniques, incidentally
also yielding upper- and lower-bound estimates for the household and school components.
For purposes of validation of these estimates we extend the estimation approach of Altonji
and Mansfield (2018), which constitutes a more direct strategy to estimate the sorting
component based on a set of constructed proxy variables. In Section 4 we describe the data;
Section 5 presents the results, showing highly comparable results across the estimation
methods; and Section 6 concludes.
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2 Conceptual framework
A conventional point of departure for the analysis of inequality in education splits the
proposed test-score generating process into the effects of households and schools in an
educational production function of the following form:
tijk = f(hj, sk) + eijk (1)
where t is a measure of educational achievement (e.g., test-scores), and indexes i =
(1, 2, . . . , N), j = (1, 2, . . . , H) and k = (1, 2, . . . , S) refer to individual children, families
and schools respectively. Following Bowles (1970) and others, hj can be considered
a comprehensive metric of the contribution of all factors shared by children in the same
household (hereafter sibs) to test-scores; and sk is a comprehensive metric of the contribution
of the given school to their learning. Finally, eijk represents the remaining individual or
idiosyncratic variation, which we assume is orthogonal to the household- and school-effects;
i.e., E(eijk|sk, hj) = 0.
To make this framework tractable for empirical analysis, two main elaborations are required.
The first is to select a specific metric of inequality. While a variety of measures have been
employed in the literature (e.g., Hanushek and Wößmann, 2006), we use the test-score
variance. As Ferreira and Gignoux (2014) note, unlike other popular inequality measures,
the variance is ordinally invariant to standardization procedures often used to express test-
scores on a comparable scale. Furthermore, the linear additive nature of the variance makes
it straightforward to isolate the contributions of individual factors (Shorrocks, 1982); and
the variance also has the attractive property of sub-group decomposability (Chakravarty,
2001).
Second, we must place some structure on f(·), specifying how the school and household
factors plausibly affect test scores. With respect to the levels expression in equation (1),
we adopt a simple additive linear model. Critically, however, this specification does not
pin-down the (co)variance structure without further assumptions. To see this, Table 1
describes four main cases, where each row invokes more specific assumptions about the
level and variance of t. In the first row we assume the household and school factors make
independent, additive contributions to outcomes. So, in terms of the associated variance,
this imposes the assumption: E(s′khj) = 0, which rules out any correlation between the two
factors.
The zero-covariance assumption embedded in Row 1 is restrictive. With respect to education,
various sorting processes, including residential segregation, school choice (by parents) and
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Table 1: Summary of alternative test-score data-generating processes
Model Score level Score variance Description
1 Restricted
linear














s + 2Σhs + σ
2


















e School effects partly
absorb household effects
Note: score variance in Rows 3 and 4 assume σ2h ≡ Var(hj) ≈ Var(h¯jk) and Var(sk) ≈ Var(s¯kj).
teacher allocation rules, have all been identified as potential determinants of schooling
outcomes (e.g., Fernandez, 2003; Nechyba, 2006; Hanushek and Yilmaz, 2007) In such
cases, the restriction in Row 1 is untenable, and an unrestricted linear model may apply
(Row 2), in which any such sorting is captured via the covariance between household- and
school-effects.
An interpretation consistent with the unrestricted linear (sorting) model is that the household
and school factors have no direct mutual effects – i.e., both effects are separately pre-
determined but become correlated through ex post processes of sorting or assortative
matching. However, this is not the only mechanism that could generate a correlation
between these factors. Some part of the school effect may reflect the causal effect of
(average) constituent households, such as when households make direct financial or time
commitments to school functioning. This kind of mechanism is also suggested by versions
of cream-skimming models, where average peer quality in a school (or class) is driven by
household characteristics, which in turn directly influences individual achievement (Walsh,
2009). An extreme version of this is captured in the third row of Table 1, which assumes s
can be partitioned into a component that is oblique or parallel to h (by construction) and an






hjK + νk = γh¯jk + νk (2)
and with E(h¯′jkνk) = 0.
Applying this expression to the unrestricted linear model, Row 3 gives a strict upper-bound
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on the variance contribution due to households. The corollary is given in Row 4, where
household-effects are assumed to be (partial) reflections of given school-effects, plus an
orthogonal component. Note that in both these cases, the observed covariance between
household- and school-effects is attributed wholly to one of the factors and no remaining
sorting is allowed (by construction). As such, and as we clarify further below, the models in
Rows 3–4 of Table 1 provide bounds on the variance components of interest, including an
absolute upper-bound on sorting.
Existing literature has frequently estimated inequality of opportunities via some variant
of the household upper-bound model. Concretely, various studies treat family effects as
a single fixed unobserved factor and omit any consideration of school-effects. Björklund
and Salvanes (2011) describe this approach and show how, under this set-up, the relative
variance contribution of households equals the correlation in outcomes between siblings.
They summarize estimates of sibling correlations in various developed countries, ranging
from 0.24 in former East Germany to over 0.60 in the USA. While many of these estimates
are based on grades of completed schooling, Mazumder (2011) estimates sibling correlations
across learning domains for children in the USA. His estimates are of the same broad
magnitude, ranging from approximately 0.35 to 0.50. For the UK, Nicoletti and Rabe
(2013) analyze results from compulsory national tests and find somewhat larger sibling
correlations (>0.50). Estimates of sibling correlations in developing countries are scarce,
mainly reflecting data constraints. Exceptions are Behrman et al. (2001), who find the sib
correlation across Latin American countries in terms of completed years of schooling, lies
between around 0.30 and 0.60; and Emran and Shilpi (2015), who find a sibling correlation
of around 60 percent in years of schooling among children in India (see also Hertz et al.,
2007).
Variation in school (or teacher) effects point to differences in school quality. Many studies
seek to assess the magnitude of these effects (e.g., Pritchett and Viarengo, 2015; Sass et al.,
2012; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006), in some cases also controlling for the contribution
of family background to avoid confounding. For instance, Freeman and Viarengo (2014)
use PISA data to investigate the (sources of) variance in school-effects. They report that a
regression of test-scores on school dummies alone (as per the school upper-bound model)
explains around two-thirds of the variation in the data, while a limited set of observed family
background variables accounts for just one-third, after controlling for school-effects. Dang
and Glewwe (2018??) find that schools and communities explain around 40 percent of the
variation in either test-scores or years of schooling among Vietnamese children. However,
studies of this sort remain rare for LMIC contexts and hardly any explicitly estimate the
complete variance contributions of both schools and households, including their covariance
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(for an exception, see Carneiro, 2008).1 As such, the direction and magnitude of sorting –
defined generically as the factor covariance – has been largely neglected.
3 Decomposition
3.1 Methods
To address the gap in the literature we propose a multi-factor variance decomposition.
The aim is to identify the main components of educational inequalities, which amounts to
apportioning the variance across households and schools without imposing any particular
covariance structure a priori. In doing so, and following Gibbons et al. (2014), we seek to
identify bounds on the variance contributions of households and schools plus the sorting
component.
The main analytical insight, from which the empirical methods flow, is that the various
models set out in Table 1 can all be (re)stated in terms of a set of primitive quantities.
As we explain further below, this means it is not necessary to estimate the correlated
variance components (σ2h, σ
2
s ) directly. To see this, note that in relation to equation (1), the
lower-bound or uncorrelated variance contribution of any given factor directly relates to its
raw or unadjusted contribution via the pairwise-correlation coefficient (ρsh). For example,
using the upper-bound household model, the lower-bound on the school component can
be rewritten as: σ2ν = (1 − ρ2hs)σ2s (see Appendix A for derivation). In other words, the
uncorrelated or lower-bound contribution due to schooling is proportional to one minus
the square of the correlation coefficient between the two factors. An equivalent expression
relates the lower-bound and raw-variance contributions of the household factor.







⇔ 2ρhsσωσν = (1− ρ2hs)(σ2t − σ2e)− (σ2ω + σ2ν) (3b)
It follows that once three specific quantities are known – namely, the two uncorrelated
variance shares and the total variance jointly attributable to the two latent factors given
1 By ‘complete’, we refer to both observed and unobserved aspects of each factor. In this sense, where studies
rely on a limited set of observed proxies for any single effect, the observed component only can be expected
to represent a part of the overall variance associated with the factor of interest (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2014),
thereby constituting a lower-bound.
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by (σ2t − σ2e ) – then the unknown correlation coefficient can be obtained as the root to
equation (3b). Furthermore, and as summarised in Appendix Table D1, any of the variance
decomposition components of interest, including the contribution of sorting, can be calcu-
lated from the three primitives (σ2ω, σ
2
ν , ρhs). Thus, the empirical objective of the varaince
decomposition is to estimate these primitives.
Before proceeding to implementation, it is important to note that households and schools
are encountered in the same locations and, thus, may share a common community (neigh-
bourhood) component. To capture this explicitly, the household and school effects can be
operationalised as follows:
zjkl = cl + hjl + skl (4)
where z represents the joint contribution of schools and households in location l; and c is
the location-specific effect. Admittedly, the nature and magnitude of these types of effects
remains controversial (e.g., Oreopoulos, 2003). However, there is growing evidence that the
quality of local environments can have a material influence on child development trajectories
(Chetty et al., 2016; Chetty and Hendren, 2018). Moreover, ignoring the contribution of
the latter term would mean they are simply absorbed by the upper-bound household or
school effect estimates, in turn muddying the interpretation of the variance decomposition
components. Consequently, as detailed below, in our empirical implementations we estimate
the implied community effects separately.2
3.2 Implementation
To estimate the primitives presented above, we first adopt a simple fixed-effects indirect
approach (denoted FEi). As suggested by Table 1, the uncorrelated (lower-bound) school
and household variance contributions can be obtained from household and school upper-
bound models respectively. In fact, following Solon et al. (2000) (also Raaum et al.,
2006), a regression of the test-scores on a set of household dummies (only) will capture
not just the stand-alone household-effect but also the effect of all unobserved variables
correlated with this factor, including sorting – i.e., following equation (2), the household
dummies will absorb the joint contribution of hj and h¯jk; and, based on these estimates,
residual variation aggregated to the school-level will be orthogonal to all included factors
by construction, yielding the uncorrelated (lower-bound) school factor (ν). Using a set of
school dummies, the same approach provides estimates for the uncorrelated (lower-bound)
2 In doing so, we impose that the estimated household/school-effects are orthogonal to the community effects,
implying the estimates of sorting will not be confounded by selection of households or schools across
communities. As such, the estimated contribution of sorting (defined above) should be interpreted in a narrow
or within-community sense.
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household variance contribution; and the associated contribution of sorting is calculated on
the basis of equation (3b). Step-by-step details of this procedure are set out in Appendix B.
A drawback of using such fixed-effects procedures is that estimates of latent factors generally
include measurement error, meaning the corresponding raw-variance shares will be upwards
biased (Koedel et al., 2015). To address this, we use empirical Bayes shrinkage, which
involves adjusting each estimated effect toward a common prior by a factor proportional to
the estimated noise-to-signal ratio in the original estimates. Following Stanek et al. (1999),
we shrink each estimated fixed effect (e.g., hˆj) toward a global mean as follows:
h˜j = h¯j + ψ(hˆj − h¯j) (5)







Here, Nj is the effective degrees of freedom available to estimate each of the j effects;
σ2
hˆ
is the raw-variance of the estimated household fixed effect; σ2ˆ is the estimated overall
residual variance; and h¯j is the sample fixed-effect mean, typically zero under conventional
normalization restrictions.
A second approach to dealing with the presence of sorting is suggested by Altonji and
Mansfield (2018) (hereafter, AM18). Motivated by a concern that sorting on unobserved
variables may bias estimates of the effects of group-level inputs, such as schools, these
authors show that where households with different characteristics also have differing
effective preferences (willingness-to-pay) for underlying school or community amenities,
group averages of observed household or pupil characteristics can be employed as control
functions. Inclusion of these generated variables, henceforth referred to as sorting proxies,
in a regression model thus permits identification of a lower-bound on the unique (variance)





O,kγ + [hjl] + [skl] + eijkl (6)
where hO,j are observed household-level covariates; h¯O,k are the set of sorting proxies.
Treating the terms in brackets as (uncorrelated) household and school random-effects, the
specification can be estimated using a linear mixed-effects estimator (denoted MLM; as
used by AM18).
An advantage of this more direct procedure is that it relies on a single estimation equa-
tion. A drawback is that the random-effects are assumed to be orthogonal to the set of
included covariates, implying equation (6) may be misspecified.3 Furthermore, while the
3 For households, a ‘tighter’ lower-bound variance share is obtained by adding the estimated variance of the
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variances of the random effects are estimated as model parameters, their associated best-
linear-unbiased predictors (BLUPs or conditional modes) typically do not share the same
variance-covariance structure as the estimated population-level moments (see Morris, 2002).
Consequently, the BLUPs may not be reliable for the purposes of investigating systematic
patterns in the random effects (e.g., subgroup heterogeneity).4 Consequently, as an addi-
tional validation procedure, we extend the AM18 approach to incorporate fixed- as opposed
to random-effects terms. As described in Appendix B, this involves modifying the indirect
estimation procedure whereby the sorting proxies are used directly to account for variation
in test-scores before estimation of the (one-way) household and school fixed-effects. This
procedure is denoted FEd.
Finally, it merits clarification why we do not seek to estimate the (correlated) variance
components from the outset (σ2h, σ
2
s ). While this might seem more straightforward, these
factors cannot be identified easily. Treating them as conventional random-effects requires
imposing a zero pairwise covariance restriction, ruling out the presence of sorting. This
limitation is not shared by two-way fixed-effects models, but a downside of these methods
is that the pairwise correlation of the estimated fixed-effects vectors tends to be biased
downwards (Abowd et al., 2002). As Andrews et al. (2008) demonstrate, this is driven by a
quasi-mechanical relation, whereby if one factor (e.g., household-effects) is over-estimated
then on average the other factor (e.g., schools) will be under-estimated (also Andrews
et al., 2012).5 Furthermore, while methods to correct for the negative covariance bias in
two-way fixed-effects estimators have been proposed (see Gaure, 2014), they remain work
in progress.
4 Data
Since 2010, the Uwezo initiative has undertaken large-scale household-based surveys of
academic achievement in Kenya, mainland Tanzania and Uganda.6 The surveys target
children residing in households aged between the official starting-school age and 16 and
are representative at both national and district levels. Excluding the initial surveys, five
fitted observed component to the variance of the random component.
4 Estimation of high-dimensional mixed-effects models also is highly computationally intensive and prone to
convergence problems. In the present case we use the lme4 package in R for estimation (Bates, 2010).
5 Intuitively, this reflects the general problem of model over-parameterization; and the magnitude of bias tends
to be larger where fewer observations are available to estimate each effect, which is particularly relevant here
as the latent effects are highly granular (e.g., households).
6 The approach adopted by Uwezo has been inspired by exercises carried out in India by the Assessment
Survey Evaluation Research Centre (ASER). For further details and comparison to other regional assessments
see Uwezo (2012); Jones et al. (2014).
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rounds of the Uwezo surveys are publicly available (2011-2015) and used here. For each
household, the surveys collected information covering general characteristics, as well as the
demographic and educational details of resident children (e.g., age, gender, whether or not
attending school, etc.). Also, all children of school age were individually administered a set
of basic oral literacy and numeracy tests, which were tailored to each country and varied by
survey round based on a common template to reflect competencies stipulated in the national
curriculum at the grade 2 level.
The literacy and numeracy tests (the Uwezo tests) are described in detail in Jones et al.
(2014). The literacy tests refer to national languages of instruction in which pupils are
tested at the end of primary school – i.e., English and Kiswahili in Tanzania and Kenya;
and just English in Uganda. Importantly, the Uwezo tests are not adapted to the children’s
ages or their completed level of schooling. Given that they focus on basic competencies, it
is thus unsurprising there are strong age- related differences, which affect both the level and
variance of scores between age cohorts. From the present perspective, this between-cohort
variation can be considered unwanted noise (see Mazumder, 2008). As a result, so as to
construct an overall metric of achievement, we transform the raw integer scores on the
individual tests in two steps. First, we apply a graded response IRT model to the suite of
tests answered by each child, yielding an estimated achievement score (the empirical Bayes
mean of the latent trait).7 Next, to place the scores on a comparable scale, we standardize
them to take a mean of zero and standard deviation of one within each survey, country and
age group. This removes all unwanted variation in the score levels that would add noise to
the decomposition; also, since the same Uwezo test forms are administered to children of
all ages in each household, it accounts for the fact that the raw score standard deviation is
not constant across age groups.
Table 2 reports regional means and standard deviations of the test-scores for the sample
used in the present analysis, pooling data from different rounds. Note that due to the
relatively basic competency levels assessed by the Uwezo tests, we exclude children above
14 years old, as they tend to perform at the upper end of the tests (and show much lower
variance). The analytical sample also excludes observations that can be perfectly predicted
using either household or school fixed-effects – i.e., singletons have been removed. The
first (column I) of the table reports weighted means of the raw competency tests (ordinal
scores); column II reports the IRT scores standardized by country and round, but not age;
and column III reports the final measures, including age standardization. As can be seen,
7 Further details on request. Due to differences in test forms between countries and across years, we estimate
these models separately by country and survey round. Also, in a small number of cases the graded response
model did not converge and, instead, we used a partial credit model. The test-scores derived from the IRT
procedure are extremely highly correlated with those constructed from a conventional standardization.
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movement from the second to the third metric constitutes a simple monotone transformation.
Also, as per the methodological discussion of Section 3, the analytical focus is on the
variance components of the test-score; and there is no evidence to suggest these dropped
observations are distributed in a systematic pattern over regions or districts. The (sample)
standard deviations of the test-scores are reported in parentheses in the table.8
To implement the decomposition procedures, household and school indexes must be defined.
The former is trivial – unique indexes are ascribed to all siblings in the same household
(in each year).9 The school-effects are less straightforward. In the present data, limited
information about schools is provided. Nonetheless, we know the kind of school attended
(none, public or private) and whether or not children attend the main public schools in their
local community (catchment area). Consequently, for each enumeration area, we categorise
children into four school categories: (1) those not attending school; (2) those attending the
specific (known, matched) local public schools; (3) those attending other public schools;
and (4) those attending private schools. The advantage of this procedure is that, within
each household, children can be associated to different school-effects – i.e., the school and
household-effects are crossed. A downside is that for the last two school categories we do
not identify specific schools; as such, these effects capture average school quality of a given
type.
Further descriptive statistics for the dataset are reported in Table 3. This shows the number of
unique children (i), households (j) and schools (k) covered in the dataset. Additionally, the
table reports summary statistics, including average child characteristics and schooling status
indicators (those out of school, the shares attending the specific matched public schools,
and those attending private schools). Overall, these indicate the sample is comprehensive
and balanced (by age and gender).10 It also reveals there are systematic differences in
schooling among countries as well as across regions within each country – e.g., in all
countries enrolment rates differ substantially across regions (e.g., from 80.0 to 96.5 percent
in Kenya) as do the shares of children attending private school.
8 In line with Ferreira and Gignoux (2014), the rank position of each region according to its test-score variance
is largely preserved, regardless of the transformation applied.
9 The Uwezo surveys are cross-sectional in nature and no attempt is made to track the same children over
time.
10 Average ages are higher in Tanzania as the starting school age is seven, compared to six in the other
countries.
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Table 2: Metrics of achievement (test-scores), by country & region
Raw score IRT IRT std.
Country & Region Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
KE Central 4.68 (1.63) 0.38 (0.86) 0.45 (0.83)
Coast 3.71 (2.04) -0.10 (1.01) -0.12 (1.01)
Eastern 4.06 (1.91) 0.04 (0.97) 0.03 (0.95)
North Eastern 3.21 (2.04) -0.36 (1.03) -0.36 (1.13)
Nyanza 3.87 (1.97) -0.06 (0.99) -0.08 (0.95)
Rift Valley 3.89 (2.01) -0.03 (1.02) -0.03 (1.03)
Western 3.66 (2.02) -0.15 (1.01) -0.19 (0.98)
All 3.95 (1.97) -0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (1.00)
TZ Arusha 3.10 (1.81) 0.19 (0.99) 0.22 (1.00)
Dar Es Salaam 3.45 (1.70) 0.36 (0.95) 0.40 (0.95)
Iringa 2.92 (1.82) 0.09 (1.00) 0.09 (1.00)
Kagera 2.67 (1.80) -0.08 (0.98) -0.09 (0.98)
Kigoma 2.28 (1.81) -0.22 (0.97) -0.24 (0.96)
Ruvuma 2.82 (1.77) 0.01 (0.97) -0.00 (0.96)
Singida 2.84 (1.84) 0.06 (1.00) 0.07 (0.98)
Tabora 2.36 (1.84) -0.23 (1.00) -0.25 (1.00)
Tanga 2.86 (1.80) 0.03 (0.98) 0.03 (0.96)
All 2.77 (1.83) 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (1.00)
UG Central 2.93 (1.82) 0.29 (0.95) 0.34 (0.96)
Eastern 2.17 (1.70) -0.13 (0.97) -0.16 (0.94)
Northern 1.95 (1.66) -0.28 (0.99) -0.32 (0.99)
Western 2.55 (1.81) 0.08 (1.00) 0.09 (0.99)
All 2.42 (1.79) 0.00 (1.00) -0.00 (1.00)
Note: achievement refers to literacy and numeracy, combined; regions in Tanzania and Kenya are
aggregated for clarity of presentation (see Appendix C); KE is Kenya; TZ is Tanzania (mainland);
UG is Uganda; test-scores combine achievement in literacy and numeracy, as described in the
text; ‘IRT’ are the achievement scores estimated via IRT models; ‘IRT std.’ are the same scores
standardized by age, country and survey round; all survey rounds are pooled.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics, by country & region
Index count School status
Country & Region i j k Age Female None Match? Private
KE Central 25,337 11,055 4,756 9.6 52.0 3.5 43.3 26.7
Coast 34,667 13,349 4,332 9.6 50.3 15.0 40.5 18.5
Eastern 56,916 23,173 7,597 9.6 50.3 5.7 59.7 6.4
North Eastern 40,239 14,489 3,031 9.3 44.9 20.0 55.2 3.6
Nyanza 52,681 20,895 7,487 9.6 50.2 8.5 50.5 13.9
Rift Valley 119,236 46,896 14,481 9.5 49.4 10.6 50.8 12.0
Western 57,200 22,063 7,149 9.6 50.2 7.6 52.9 8.0
All 386,276 151,920 48,833 9.6 50.0 9.0 50.3 13.5
TZ Arusha 32,535 13,738 4,358 10.0 48.8 10.4 53.4 6.0
Dar Es Salaam 13,795 5,867 2,032 10.0 51.6 7.7 48.2 5.7
Iringa 29,351 12,876 4,254 10.0 50.7 13.6 61.9 3.9
Kagera 32,664 13,103 4,186 10.0 49.9 17.5 54.0 3.8
Kigoma 20,994 8,700 2,626 10.0 50.4 20.9 52.5 5.4
Ruvuma 17,514 7,780 2,809 10.1 50.4 10.0 66.2 2.8
Singida 19,926 8,574 2,603 10.0 50.5 14.7 61.6 3.2
Tabora 33,127 13,058 3,835 9.9 50.1 22.4 51.0 3.7
Tanga 24,561 10,336 3,171 10.0 49.4 12.5 61.1 3.3
All 224,467 94,032 29,874 10.0 50.2 15.3 56.3 4.2
UG Central 46,474 16,954 6,016 9.5 49.9 5.1 24.3 48.2
Eastern 86,761 30,557 8,707 9.6 49.8 4.3 44.7 23.9
Northern 72,306 26,654 6,804 9.5 48.7 13.4 53.1 6.0
Western 52,746 20,065 6,744 9.6 50.3 6.3 36.2 29.0
All 258,287 94,230 28,271 9.5 49.7 6.9 38.9 28.0
Note: regions in Tanzania and Kenya are aggregated for clarity of presentation (see Appendix C); KE is Kenya;
TZ is Tanzania (mainland); UG is Uganda; i, j, k refer to the number of unique observations for the individual,
household and school-grade effects respectively; all other columns are means or proportions; ‘match?’ indicates the




We begin with a preliminary review of the degree of spatial clustering or segregation – i.e.,
the extent to which similar types of children are found in the same schools or communities.
To do so, we compare the correlation between individuals within different aggregate units,
which is equivalent to the proportion of the variance attributable to the between-group
structure of the data (for similar exercises see Fryer and Levitt, 2004; Friesen and Krauth,
2007, 2010; Lindahl, 2011; Emran and Shilpi, 2015). The magnitude of the correlation
across members of the same group, and how quickly this falls as we move to higher levels of
aggregation, thus indicates the extent to which variables are spatially segregated (clustered).
For instance, if local communities only contained households with the exact same socio-
economic status, then the proportion of variance in socio-economic status accounted for by
communities would be equal to that accounted for by households, indicating a very high
degree of clustering.
Results from this exercise are reported in Table 4, covering a range of variables. As might
be expected, assuming child gender is approximately random, the between-group variance
share accounted for by households is extremely low. For the remaining variables, however,
clustering by households, schools or communities is much higher. For instance, more
than two thirds of the variation in access to clean water is accounted for both by schools
and by communities. Overall, a little more than half of the total variation in aggregate
socio-economic status in the region (SES) is attributable to (average) differences between
distinct communities, implying substantial levels of residential clustering or economic
segregation.
Turning to the educational outcomes in the bottom of the table, we observe somewhat lower
magnitudes of clustering across communities and schools, partly reflecting the presence
of variation between children within households.11 In terms of achievement on the Uwezo
tests as measured by the age-adjusted IRT scores, the correlation between siblings is almost
50 percent, which is highly comparable to magnitudes found in a range of other countries
(Section 2). More notably, however, the correlation between pupils attending the same
schools, as well as between children in the same communities, is only moderately lower.
Nearly 40 percent of the overall variation in achievement is accounted for by schools, and
30 percent between distinct residential locations. Although the definition of communities
11 Of course, enrolment is fully accounted for by school-level variation; but there is within-household variation
in enrolment.
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Table 4: Percent of between-group variance attributable to alternative grouping structures
Group level→ Hhld. Sch. Vill. District Region Ratios
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (b)/(a) (c)/(b)
Female 3.0 3.0 1.7 0.1 0.0 1.01 0.56
Hhld. has electricity 100.0 54.0 47.5 19.1 7.4 0.54 0.88
Hhld. has clean water 100.0 70.5 66.9 13.4 2.8 0.70 0.95
Hhld. owns phone 100.0 38.9 33.0 10.3 5.4 0.39 0.85
Mother’s education 100.0 52.7 46.4 13.6 6.7 0.53 0.88
Aggregate SES index 100.0 58.6 51.8 22.5 9.4 0.59 0.88
Enrolled 40.6 100.0 27.7 8.2 3.2 2.46 0.28
Highest grade 50.2 42.9 31.1 11.8 5.2 0.85 0.72
Math achivement (IRT) 42.6 31.9 25.4 7.3 2.9 0.75 0.80
Literacy achivement (IRT) 45.0 34.4 28.2 10.7 5.0 0.76 0.82
Overall achivement (IRT) 48.8 37.5 30.2 10.6 4.6 0.77 0.81
Note: cells in columns (a)–(e) report the correlation between children within the same grouping unit
(e.g., households, schools, etc.), which is the adjusted R2 from a one-way fixed-effects model, without
covariates; for highest grade, this correlation is calculated conditioning on child age; final two columns
report ratios.
is not equivalent across studies, these latter magnitudes appear to be a factor larger than
encountered in developed countries. For example for pupils in the UK, Nicoletti and Rabe
(2013) find a sibling correlation (the household upper-bound variance share) in achievement
of around the same order of magnitude, but a neighbour correlation of less than 15 percent
(among children at Key Stages 2 and 4); and in the USA, Solon et al. (2000) find a sibling
correlation of around 50 percent in educational attainment, but a neighbour correlation of
under 20 percent. In comparison, the degree of clustering of both economic and educational
outcomes in East Africa appears large.
5.2 Aggregate variance bounds
Turning to the variance decomposition, Table 5 reports estimates of the three primitives
required to calculate the within-community sorting component (also shown). Together these
form the basis for calculation of the variance bounds, which are set out in Table 6 and cover
the household upper-bound model (HUB), the unrestricted linear model (ULM) and school
upper-bound model (SUB). In both tables we present estimates on a pooled (all East Africa)
basis from each of the three procedures described in Section 3 – namely, our own indirect
fixed-effects approach (FEi), as well as the mixed-effects model (MLM) and the direct
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Table 5: Primitive components of variance decomposition, all East Africa
Absolute (in st. dev. units) Relative (in %)
FEi MLM FEd FEi MLM FEd
Household σω 45.1 46.0 45.1 20.3 21.1 20.3
(0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
School σν 14.3 27.6 21.2 2.1 7.6 4.5
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Correlation ρhs 0.41 0.40 0.30 0.41 0.40 0.30
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
⇒ Sorting 2Σhs 25.3 34.5 24.9 6.4 11.9 6.2
(0.3) (1.0) (0.3) (0.2) (0.6) (0.2)
Note: columns indicate the outcome transformation and decomposition method (fixed-effects
indirect, mixed-effects linear model and fixed-effects direct respectively); ‘absolute’ refers to
standard deviation units (× 100); ‘relative’ is as a percent of the total variance; standard errors (in
parentheses) calculated via a clustered bootstrap procedure.
fixed-effects (FEd) procedures based on AM18.12 The tables also report results based on
absolute variance shares, given in standard deviation units (×100), and relative variance
shares, given in percentages. The relative contribution of the relevant components to overall
inequality of opportunity, which effectively refers to the systematic components above the
level of the individual, are further illustrated in Figure 1.
Looking at Table 5, we note that the three decomposition methods yield highly consistent
results; hence, the different methods yield similar estimates for the various variance bounds
(Table 6). Despite some differences in precise magnitudes, discussed further below, this
suggests the present results are robust to the method of estimation (e.g., mixed- versus fixed-
effects) and, more specifically, that our simple indirect approach (FEi) performs adequately.
Furthermore, we find a positive correlation between the household- and school-effects,
ranging between 0.30 and 0.41. Consequently, the derived within-community sorting
component, shown in the final row, is always larger than the stand-alone (lower-bound)
contribution of schools. As such, within-community sorting makes a non-trivial contribution
to the total variance in test-scores. This contribution may not appear so large, particularly
when viewed in relative terms (between 12 and 6 percent). But this must be placed in
context. According to the Uwezo data, an additional year of schooling is associated with an
approximate 0.18 standard deviation increase in a child’s test-score ceteris paribus. Thus,
12 For the MLM results, variance components are calculated from the estimated BLUPs of the random-effects
plus their standard error, which match the population second moments. Furthermore, the estimated BLUPs
of the random-effects show material cross-correlation, particularly with the community effect. As a result, in
order to assure comparability with the fixed-effects procedures in which the school and household primitives
are defined as uncorrelated factors, we use only the component of the estimated school and household
BLUPs that are orthogonal to the community component. Further details available on request.
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Table 6: Decomposition of variation in achievement across East Africa
Method→ FEi MLM FEd
Model→ HUB ULM SUB HUB ULM SUB HUB ULM SUB
(a) Absolute contributions (st. dev. units × 100):
Individual 10.0 10.0 10.0 8.1 8.1 8.1 10.0 10.0 10.0
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Household 55.9 49.5 45.1 62.0 50.1 46.0 53.7 47.2 45.1
(0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (1.1) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2)
School 14.3 15.7 36.1 27.6 30.1 49.9 21.2 22.2 36.1
(0.2) (0.2) (0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (1.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.4)
Sorting - 25.3 - - 34.5 - - 24.9 -
(0.3) (1.0) (0.3)
Community 37.1 37.1 37.1 40.5 40.5 40.5 37.1 37.1 37.1
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
Residual 72.0 72.0 72.0 60.7 60.7 60.7 72.0 72.0 72.0
(1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (1.0) (1.0) (1.0)
(b) Relative contributions (percent):
Individual 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Household 31.3 24.5 20.3 38.4 25.1 21.1 28.9 22.3 20.3
(0.6) (0.4) (0.3) (0.9) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.4) (0.3)
School 2.1 2.5 13.0 7.6 9.1 24.9 4.5 4.9 13.0
(0.1) (0.1) (0.4) (0.1) (0.1) (1.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.4)
Sorting - 6.4 - - 11.9 - - 6.2 -
(0.2) (0.6) (0.2)
Community 13.7 13.7 13.7 16.4 16.4 16.4 13.7 13.7 13.7
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Residual 51.9 51.9 51.9 36.9 36.9 36.9 51.9 51.9 51.9
(0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8)
Note: super-columns indicate the decomposition method (fixed-effects indirect, mixed-effects linear model
and fixed-effects direct respectively) and sub-columns the assumed variance components model, which are
the household upper-bound model (HUB), the unrestricted linear model (ULM) and the school upper-bound
model (SUB); standard errors (in parentheses) calculated via a clustered bootstrap procedure.
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Figure 1: Variance components (in % of inequality of opportunities), alternative methods
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Households Schools Sorting Communities
Note: bars indicate the percentage contribution of each factor to inequality of educational opportunity (IEO),
which is the variance accounted for by systematic supra-individual factors (households, schools, communities
plus their covariance); abbreviations for methods and models are as per Table 6.
the contribution of sorting to the variance in test-scores is roughly equivalent to around half
a year of schooling.
Three further points merit note. First, sources of inequality of educational opportunity
outside the household, including sorting, are substantial. Considering the ULM results in
Table 6, the combination of schools, communities and sorting is always greater than the
household contribution alone; and the same insight derives from the school upper-bound
model, where the contributions of schooling and communities exceeds that of households.13
Second, the stand-alone contribution of schools also is fairly moderate, representing no
more than 10 percent of the total variance under the ULM estimates. Necessarily, this
limits the overall contribution of sorting; in this sense, were variation between schools to
increase, one would expect the contribution of sorting also to be larger (assuming the same
13 Another way of interpreting the magnitude of the sorting contribution is in terms of the gap between the
lower and upper-bound contributions of schools and households. Following Table D1, the smaller the
correlation coefficient, the smaller the gap. But for both effects, the gap is relatively wide – e.g., based on
the direct method, the school-effect ranges from 4.2 to 11.3 percent of the variation in achievement.
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correlation holds). In comparative terms, however, these magnitudes are not especially
small. For example, AM18 estimate that school and community effects jointly explain
around 5 percent of the variation in high school graduation rates (lower-bounds). Here,
schools alone account for roughly the same amount of variation in achievement; but, when
combined with community effects, the joint contribution is at least 15 percent (Table 6).
Similarly, the joint contribution of schools and communities taken from the school upper-
bound estimates, which are generally more comparable to estimates found elsewhere (e.g.,
Freeman and Viarengo, 2014) are hardly trivial. Our estimates for East Africa place this joint
effect at around 25 percent (at least), which is similar to the average school-effect variance
contribution calculated by Pritchett and Viarengo (2015) for a range of countries. So, while
the present results do point to some similarities in the respective variance contributions
of different components between East Africa and elsewhere, the material contribution of
residential location within the joint school/community effect is noteworthy.
Third, differences in estimates between the three decomposition methods appear to derive
from two main sources. On the one hand, some of the differences for the correlation
and sorting components simply reflect the sensitivity of calculations based on equation
(3b). Recall we estimate ρhs from the household- and school-effect lower-bounds. Thus,
even minor differences here, such as slightly larger values under the MLM approach, are
magnified in the estimates for the correlation term (as it is their product which is of interest
for sorting). On the other hand, the mixed- and fixed-effects approaches treat the community
effects in a slightly different fashion. In the latter case, community effects are removed
from the joint fixed effect (households plus schools) in the first of the series of orthogonal
projections (see Appendix B). As such, and in similar fashion to the upper-bound models
discussed in Section 2, the estimated community variance contribution will capture both
the direct effect of shared community-level factors on outcomes (e.g., via environmental
conditions) plus any covariance with either household or school factors. Thus, any possible
sorting of households (or teachers) across different communities will be absorbed by the
community effect.14 In the mixed-effects approach, all terms are estimated simultaneously,
meaning that a strict distinction between within- and between-community components is
not enforced ex ante. Although we implement a correction for this to obtain the uncorrelated
school and household components (see above), this methodological difference is likely to
explain the (small) disparities in our estimates of the community effect and the uncorrelated
variance components.
14 Since we not observe the same households (or teachers) across different communities, we are not able to
distinguish between the direct and sorting effects associated with residential location.
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5.3 Subgroup heterogeneity
Averages can often hide substantial heterogeneity. Thus, to look behind the pooled results,
we take advantage of the properties of the variance and calculate the decomposition for
specific subgroups. These results are presented in Table 7, where we stratify individuals
along various dimensions – gender, age group, schooling status, school type and SES
quintile. For simplicity, and given the broad consistency across the empirical procedures,
hereafter we only present results for the direct fixed-effects method. This is chosen as
it gives the most conservative estimates for both the correlation coefficient and sorting
component (see Table 5). For reference, Appendix Table D2 presents the identical subgroup
decomposition in absolute magnitudes; and Tables D3 and D4 present the same relative and
absolute results based on the mixed-effects method, which provides the largest estimates of
the sorting component among the three methods.
Focusing on the main insights, there are no systematic differences in the variance compo-
nents by gender or age. However, there are moderate differences among socio-economic
groups. In particular, lower quintiles display comparatively larger contributions due to
both households and schools, as well as a higher correlation coefficient, leading to a larger
sorting component (5.4 versus 3.7 percent). In other words, IEO is larger among the less
advantaged. Even more critical differences emerge between children who are in and out
of school. Recall that the school-effect treats all children within each community who are
not enrolled as a separate category (effect). Thus, when we undertake the decomposition
for all children, the school and sorting effects not only refer to specific schools (for those
enrolled) but also the effect of the local environment (for children out of school), including
the general quality of available schools. In this sense, the overall variance decomposition
(e.g., Table 6) refers to both the extensive and intensive margins of engagement in the school
system.
Understood in this light, the variance decomposition for the subgroup of enrolled children
only captures variation at the intensive margin within the formal school system; and the
variance decomposition for the subgroup of non-enrolled children only captures variation
at the intensive margin outside of the schooling system. Since we note that the household-
school-effect correlation is considerably lower within these two subgroups (<15 percent
versus 24 percent overall), mechanically this means that the group-specific averages of
both effects must not only diverge considerably from the overall means, but they do so in
the same direction as the correlation coefficient. That is, out-of-school children face both
lower household and lower (general) school-effects. In turn, much of the contribution due
to sorting is at the extensive margin, reflecting differences in conditions faced by children
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attending school and those who do not. Plausibly, some of this may be due to a causal effect
of poor-quality local schools faced by less advantaged children on the decision to attend;
but we cannot prove this here.
The final subgroup distinction in Table 7 points to differences between school types within
the schooling system. In particular, we find a larger household-school-effect correlation and
(correspondingly) a larger relative contribution of sorting among children attending private
schools compared to those attending public school (16 versus 12 percent). We also note
that the contribution of variation between schools is moderately larger in the private sector.
This may well reflect differences associated with lower- and higher-cost private schools,
where these segments serve children of quite different backgrounds. Also, and consistent
with previous literature, this suggests that where there is greater scope for school choice,
processes of sorting tend to be larger.
5.4 Spatial heterogeneity
A related form of heterogeneity relates to geographical locations. Arguably, this is par-
ticularly relevant from the perspective of policy as it speaks to the possibility of targeted
interventions. A spatial perspective is also motivated by educational differentials within
each country, as shown in Table 2. These indicate large differences in both the average
level and variance of test-scores across regions of each country. Retaining our focus on
the unrestricted linear model presentation estimated via the direct (fixed-effects) method,
Figure 2 illustrates the relative variance components for each country, and Tables D5–D7
report results at the regional level within each country.
As in the previous subsection, we find substantial heterogeneity in the size and relative im-
portance of the different factors. Between countries, the structure of (relative) IEO appears
most distinct in Tanzania where the contribution of communities and sorting is generally
larger. Within countries, the absolute variance contribution of different components can
vary by a factor of around three. For instance, in Kenya the absolute contribution of sorting
in the Central region is 0.11 standard deviation units versus 0.33 in the North Eastern region.
Similarly, we see large differences in the variance contribution of schools, ranging from
0.13 (Central) to 0.30 units (North Eastern). In relative terms such differences are somewhat
less pronounced; but, even here there remain material differences in the contributions of
schools and sorting among regions. We also note that regions containing the capital city in
each country (defined here as Central in Kenya and Uganda, Dar Es Salaam in Tanzania)
tend to display comparatively lower absolute test-score inequalities, as well as somewhat
smaller variation due to schools and sorting. This is consistent with an interpretation that
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Table 7: Sub-group variance decomposition (in percent of total variance)












Female No 0.9 22.4 5.0 13.8 6.4 51.6 100.0 0.30
(0.0) (0.5) (0.1) (0.3) (0.2) (1.0) - (0.01)
Yes 0.8 22.2 4.8 13.8 6.0 52.3 100.0 0.29
(0.0) (0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (0.2) (1.0) - (0.01)
Age group 6-9 1.4 23.0 5.6 14.3 6.5 49.1 100.0 0.29
(0.1) (0.6) (0.2) (0.4) (0.3) (1.5) - (0.01)
10-13 0.6 21.6 4.4 13.3 5.9 54.3 100.0 0.30
(0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.7) - (0.01)
SES quintile 1 1.3 23.5 5.5 14.9 7.5 47.4 100.0 0.33
(0.1) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.6) - (0.01)
2 1.2 22.9 5.5 14.2 7.1 49.1 100.0 0.32
(0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.6) - (0.01)
3 1.0 22.9 5.1 14.1 6.1 50.7 100.0 0.28
(0.0) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.4) - (0.01)
4 1.0 22.3 5.4 14.1 6.2 51.0 100.0 0.28
(0.0) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.5) - (0.01)
5 0.9 20.8 5.1 15.3 6.1 51.7 100.0 0.30
(0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.2) (0.5) - (0.01)
Enrolled No 1.6 18.0 10.4 14.1 4.4 51.4 100.0 0.16
(0.1) (0.6) (0.3) (0.5) (0.4) (1.0) - (0.02)
Yes 0.3 22.8 4.2 14.6 3.8 54.2 100.0 0.20
(0.0) (0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.8) - (0.00)
Private school No 0.4 23.7 3.8 15.2 3.5 53.4 100.0 0.18
(0.0) (0.2) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.4) - (0.00)
Yes 0.3 21.3 6.0 14.1 4.8 53.6 100.0 0.21
(0.0) (0.4) (0.3) (0.5) (0.3) (1.1) - (0.01)
All 1.0 22.3 4.9 13.7 6.2 51.9 100.0 0.30
(0.0) (0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (0.2) (0.8) - (0.01)
Note: the table reports direct fixed-effects variance decomposition estimates, based on the unrestricted linear
model representation; standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated via a clustered bootstrap procedure.
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Note: bars indicate the percentage contribution of each factor to inequality of educational
opportunity (IEO), which is the variance accounted for by systematic supra-individual
factors (households, schools, communities and their covariance); estimates taken from the
direct fixed-effects variance decomposition procedure, based on the unrestricted linear model
representation; KE is Kenya; TZ is Tanzania (mainland); and UG is Uganda.
capital cities tend to provide more equal access to schools of a similar quality.
An advantage of the Uwezo data is that we can run the same analysis at the district
level. Figure 3 plots the cumulative empirical district-level distributions of the relative
variance shares for the four main IEO components taken from the preferred estimates, by
country. These confirm substantial variations across all components within each country,
but country-specific differences continue to be evident – i.e., the distribution functions
display (approximate) first-order dominance in all cases. Variation in the magnitude of
sorting across countries is confirmed in Figure 4, which shows the cumulative distribution
of the estimates for ρhs across districts, based on both the direct and MLM procedures. This
underlines that the correlation between household- and school-effects is substantially larger
in Tanzania – e.g., for the median district, the correlation in Tanzania is almost twice that in
Uganda. But within each country, movement from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the
district-level distribution is associated with at least a 15 percentage point increase in the
correlation coefficient. In other words, spatial heterogeneity in sorting is material.
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Note: lines indicate the cumulative distribution of of relative contributions of each factor to total test-score variance;
estimates taken from the direct fixed-effects variance decomposition procedure, based on the unrestricted linear
model representation; KE is Kenya; TZ is Tanzania (mainland); and UG is Uganda.
5.5 Long-run inequalities
Finally, following the spirit of Kremer (1997), we consider the implications of sorting for
long-run (steady-state) educational inequalities. The key idea here is that in the presence
of positive educational sorting, children from more advantaged families receive a double
benefit that can be expected to exacerbate inequalities over time. Such children benefit both
from family circumstances and from higher-quality schooling, which has a multiplicative
effect across generations.
In order to quantify the potential magnitude of these effects, we move to a dynamic or inter-
generational setting. Furthermore, we adopt the simple formulation that household effects
(h) are directly proportional to parental achievement, reflecting both parental capacity to
support learning and other characteristics that flow from their educational level. Indexing
generations by g, and using previous notation, these assumptions imply hjg ≈ hj0 + δtj,g−1,
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Note: lines indicate the cumulative distribution of estimates for the household-school pairwise
correlation coefficient under different decomposition procedures (MLM and fixed effects direct),
based on the unrestricted linear model representation; KE is Kenya; TZ is Tanzania (mainland); and
UG is Uganda.











where δ¯ = σ2ωg/σ
2
tg−1 is the sorting-invariant or raw inter-generational persistence parameter.
From this, we can then solve for the long-run steady-state level of educational inequality:
σ2t˜ =





1− ρ2 − δ¯2 (8)
where σ2c is the upper-bound variance contribution associated with residential location
(which we treat as exogenous, for simplicity). (See Appendix A for derivation).
To simulate this model, a value for the raw persistence parameter needs to be chosen. To
do so, we opt for a data-driven approach and make the assumption that currently-observed
inequality is approximately at the steady-state (i.e., σ2t = σ
2
t˜
), allowing us to solve for δ¯
using equation (A3c) based on previously-estimated values of the primitives. This gives
us the magnitude of the persistence parameter that would maintain achievement inequality
at current levels. Fixing δ¯ at this also means that simulations based on changes to (other)
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primitives in the model can be interpreted directly with reference to the current magnitude
of achievement inequality. Appendix Figure E1 plots the resulting district-level cumulative
distributions of the inequality-constant persistence parameter, which range from 0.30 to
0.56; and the corresponding pooled overall coefficient is 0.46. Notably, these magnitudes are
broadly consistent with estimates of intergenerational regression coefficients in educational
attainment found elsewhere.15 In other words, our baseline assumption is likely to be
conservative.
With the constant-inequality persistence parameter in hand, we now use equation (A3c)
to simulate the steady-state level of inequality under alternative assumptions for other
inputs. First, we set the sorting correlation coefficient ρ to zero, under which the same
equation simplifies to σ2
t˜




e)/(1 − δ¯2). Figure 5(a) plots the results of
this exercise, taking districts as the unit of observation, and where the magnitudes of the
primitives entering each unit-level calculation are taken from the earlier fixed-effects direct
(FEd) estimates. At the average magnitude of the sorting coefficient, indicated by the
blue vertical lines, steady-state inequality falls by about 12 percent relative to the baseline;
but in a non-trivial number of districts, the reduction is more than 20 percent. In light of
earlier results, this reveals that eliminating educational sorting would lead to a substantially
larger reduction in long-run inequality than might be suggested by the relative variance
contribution of sorting itself (Figure 3). Indeed, the relative variance contribution due to
sorting is roughly only half the expected proportional decline in inequality if sorting were
to be reduced.
Eliminating within-community sorting does not address segregation of either households or
teachers (schools) by residential location, as captured by the community effect. Our earlier
results indicated this term was material, potentially reflecting significant barriers to internal
mobility in the East African context. To look at the implications of this more general form
of sorting for long-run educational inequality, Figure 5(b) estimates the unique impact of
halving the variance contribution due to community effects. For the average district, the
reduction in inequality compared to the baseline is similar to the first simulation, falling
by 10 percent. And combining these two scenarios equates to more than a 20 percent fall
in long-run inequality, on average – see Figure 5(c). To put this magnitude of reduction
15 For instance, Hertz et al. (2007) estimate an average persistence parameter of 0.42 for a range of mostly
developed countries. However, existing estimates for (low income) developing countries typically point to
somewhat larger values. For instance, Emran and Shilpi (2015) find a persistence parameter of around 0.50
in India; and in a sample of African countries, Azomahou and Yitbarek (2016) find an average persistence
of 0.66. These values are generally larger than our own estimates, implying a higher steady-state level of





1− ρ2hs, we find steady-state inequality is expected to be 40 percent larger than at present (for the
region as a whole).
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(d) Equivalent cut in persistence
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Note: panels (a)-(c) plot the ratio of long-run inequality to present inequality under different assumptions; in
(a) we assume sorting is eliminated; in (b) we halve the variance contribution due to community effects; and in
(c) we combine the latter two; panel (d) indicates the relative reduction in the intergenerational persistence
parameter required to achieve the fall in long-run inequality indicated in panel (c) (e.g., 0.1 implies a 10
percent reduction); vertical blue line is the pooled correlation coefficient, given in the x-axis.
in inequality in context, it is equivalent to a very substantial fall in the intergenerational
persistence of educational achievement. Figure 5(d) reports the percentage reduction in the
persistence parameter required to match the effect of both eliminating within-community
sorting and halving between-community segregation. On average, the equivalent reduction
is over 40 percent, implying a required persistence parameter of 0.27 (versus 0.42 in the
baseline).
6 Conclusions
There is continued debate regarding the extent to which sorting exacerbates inequalities,
including in educational attainment and achievement. We contribute to this debate by
undertaking a variance decomposition, treating sorting as the contribution of the covariance
between household- and school-effects to variation in educational outcomes. We quantify
the contribution of sorting to learning inequalities among over 1,000,000 children in three
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East African countries: Kenya, mainland Tanzania and Uganda.
To estimate the contribution of sorting, we propose three complementary approaches. First,
we show how an indirect procedure, based on separate one-way fixed-effects estimators,
can identify the lower-bound or uncorrelated variance contributions of both schools and
households, which are then used as necessary primitives to derive the sorting component.
Second, we adopt the approach of AM18 (Altonji and Mansfield, 2018), who show how
group means of observed factors can absorb confounding effects of sorting on unobserved
characteristics. This helps isolate the independent contributions of the factors of interest,
from which lower-bound variance contributions can be estimated using mixed-effects
estimators. Third, we extend the AM18 approach to allow for fixed- as opposed to random-
effects, which is both computationally more tractable and better suited to explore sub-group
heterogeneity.
Empirically, all three estimation procedures indicate positive sorting of pupils across schools
that accounts for up to 8 percent of the total test-score variance and almost a fifth of the
joint variation in test-scores due to schools, communities and households. The sorting
contribution tends to be larger among families at the top and bottom ends of the socio-
economic distribution, among those sending their children to private schools, as well as in
specific locations.
To explore the implications of these results, we conduct simulations of how learning
inequality evolves over time. These show that for the average district in the region, the
steady-state level of educational inequality would fall by around 10 percent if sorting were
to be fully eliminated. Moreover, in a number of districts, the reduction in inequality from
eliminating sorting would be over 20 percent of the total variance and over 40 percent of
IEO. As such, this suggests that policies that take sorting into account, and even actively
counteract it, merit consideration.
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A.1 Correlated and uncorrelated components
To show the relationship between the uncorrelated and correlated school component, we
start with the household upper-bound model from Table 1:
σ2ν =σ
2
t − (1 + γ)2σ2h − σ2e (A1a)
=σ2h + σ
2
s + 2Σhs − (1 + γ)2σ2h (A1b)
=σ2h + σ
2
s + 2ρshσhσs − (1 + γ)2σ2h (A1c)
=σ2s − γ2σ2h (A1d)
= (1− ρ2hs)σ2s (A1e)
where σ2t is the total variance to be decomposed. Movement from the third to the fourth line
derives from the definition of the covariance term, using equation (2), as: Cov(hj, sk) ≡
Σsh = γVar(hj); and movement from the fourth to the final line uses the fact that γ defines
the slope of the (approximate) linear relation between h¯ and s: γ = ρhs(σs/σh).
A.2 Steady-state inequality
Based on the unrestricted linear model of Table 1, combined with equations (4) and (7),









In long-run equilibrium it must hold that ∀n > 0 : σ2tg+n = σ2tg = σ2t˜ , thus:
σ2t˜ (1− δ2) = σ2s + 2δρhsσsσt˜ + σ2c + σ2e (A3a)















1− ρ2 − δ¯2 (A3c)
B Empirical steps
Following Section 3, we recognise that estimates of separate fixed-effects (e.g., household
and schools) in a two-way setting are expected to be biased from a mechanical negative
pairwise covariance. As such and excluding the distinct issue of measurement error, there
is no reason to suspect this concern affects estimates of their joint contribution. In light
of this, to undertake the variance decompositions we begin by running a full model with
multiple fixed effects. Then we apply a sequence of orthogonal projections to identify the
uncorrelated components of the estimated joint effect.
Concretely, for the indirect fixed-effects procedure (FEi) we proceed as follows:
1. use the fully-specified model to obtain the joint contribution of the latent factors
(zjkl);
2. project zˆjkl on the location indexes to obtain the (upper-bound) location-specific
effect;
3. separately project the household- and school-effect indexes on the fitted residual joint
factor from Step 2, (zˆjkl− cˆl), in each case obtaining their corresponding upper-bound
contributions; and
4. separately project the household- and school-effect indexes on the relevant residuals
from Step 3 to obtain their lower-bound contributions (e.g., the school lower-bound
is estimated from the residual from the household upper-bound: zˆjkl − cˆl − hˆ∗k, h∗k =
hj + γh¯jk).
For the extension of the AM18 approach to allow for fixed-effects (FEd), we proceed as
follows:
1. estimate a fully-specified model, including two-way fixed-effects, to obtain the joint
contribution of the latent factors (zjkl, see equation 4);
2. project zˆjkl on the location indexes to obtain the (upper-bound) location-specific
effect (cˆl);
3. project the residual from Step 2 (zˆjkl − cˆl) on the set of sorting proxies (h¯′O,k);16
4. project the school indexes (only) on the residual component of the joint factor obtained
from Step 3 (zˆjkl − cˆl − h¯′O,kβˆ) to obtain the uncorrelated school contribution;
16 Where, h¯′O,k refer to school-level means derived from observed household- and pupil-level variables.
5. project the household indexes (only) on the final residual taken from Step 4 to obtain
the uncorrelated household lower-bound contribution (ωˆk).
In both the above approaches, the sequential orthogonal projections ensure that the primi-
tives of interest are not only mutually uncorrelated but also uncorrelated with any observed
variables that enter the model, including the sorting proxies. Furthermore, any such
additional control variables can be entered in a straightforward manner. For instance,
individual-specific observed variables would enter the fully-specified model in Step 1 of
each procedure. Also, observed household (school) characteristics are added in Step 3 of
each procedure, thereby tightening the one-way estimates of the school (household) effects
(see Raaum et al., 2006).
C Regional aggregates
Table C1: Definition of aggregated regions
Region names
Country Aggregated Original Obs.
KE Central Central 22117
KE Central Nairobi 3220
KE Coast Coast 34667
KE Eastern Eastern 56916
KE North Eastern North Eastern 40239
KE Nyanza Nyanza 52681
KE Rift Valley Rift Valley 119236
KE Western Western 57200
TZ Arusha Arusha 11006
TZ Arusha Kilimanjaro 9410
TZ Arusha Mara 12119
TZ Dar Es Salaam Dar Es Salaam 3236
TZ Dar Es Salaam Pwani 10559
TZ Iringa Dodoma 10405
TZ Iringa Iringa 9312
TZ Iringa Morogoro 8060
TZ Iringa Njombe 1574
TZ Kagera Geita 3276
TZ Kagera Kagera 13242
TZ Kagera Mwanza 16146
TZ Kigoma Katavi 1412
TZ Kigoma Kigoma 9261
TZ Kigoma Rukwa 10321
TZ Ruvuma Lindi 6166
TZ Ruvuma Mtwara 3781
TZ Ruvuma Ruvuma 7567
TZ Singida Mbeya 10862
TZ Singida Singida 9064
TZ Tabora Shinyanga 16656
TZ Tabora Simiyu 3245
TZ Tabora Tabora 13226
TZ Tanga Manyara 10846
TZ Tanga Tanga 13715
UG Central Central 46474
UG Eastern Eastern 86761
UG Northern Northern 72306
UG Western Western 52746
D Additional tables
Table D1: Bounds on variance components
Component Lower-bound Upper-bound
















Sorting 0 2ρhsσhσs =
2ρhsσνσω
1− ρ2hs
Note: the table shows how the various variance bounds (c.f., Table 6) can be calculated directly from the
underling primitives (c.f., Table 5).
Table D2: Sub-group variance decomposition (in std. dev. units ×100)












Female No 0.09 0.47 0.22 0.25 0.37 0.72 1.00 0.30
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Yes 0.09 0.47 0.22 0.24 0.37 0.72 1.00 0.29
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age group 6-9 0.12 0.47 0.23 0.25 0.37 0.68 0.97 0.29
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
10-13 0.08 0.48 0.21 0.25 0.37 0.75 1.02 0.30
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
SES quintile 1 0.11 0.49 0.24 0.27 0.39 0.69 1.00 0.33
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2 0.11 0.47 0.23 0.26 0.37 0.69 0.99 0.32
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
3 0.10 0.46 0.22 0.24 0.36 0.68 0.96 0.28
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
4 0.10 0.45 0.22 0.24 0.36 0.68 0.95 0.28
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
5 0.09 0.42 0.21 0.23 0.36 0.66 0.92 0.30
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Enrolled No 0.13 0.43 0.32 0.21 0.38 0.72 1.01 0.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Yes 0.06 0.46 0.20 0.19 0.37 0.71 0.97 0.20
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Private school No 0.06 0.46 0.19 0.18 0.37 0.70 0.95 0.18
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Yes 0.05 0.44 0.23 0.21 0.35 0.69 0.94 0.21
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
All 0.10 0.47 0.22 0.25 0.37 0.72 1.00 0.30
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Note: the table reports direct fixed-effects variance decomposition estimates, based on the unrestricted linear
model representation; standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated via a clustered bootstrap procedure.
Table D3: Sub-group variance decomposition (in percent), MLM procedure












Female No 0.7 24.9 9.0 16.4 11.8 37.2 100.0 0.39
(0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.6) (0.9) - (0.02)
Yes 0.6 25.3 9.1 16.5 12.1 36.4 100.0 0.40
(0.0) (0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (0.7) (1.0) - (0.02)
Age group 6-9 0.9 27.1 10.1 17.2 14.0 30.6 100.0 0.42
(0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.6) (0.8) - (0.02)
10-13 0.3 23.4 8.2 15.7 10.2 42.2 100.0 0.37
(0.0) (0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (0.5) (0.9) - (0.01)
SES quintile 1 0.8 22.0 8.7 18.0 9.2 41.3 100.0 0.34
(0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.4) (0.4) (0.7) - (0.02)
2 0.8 22.9 9.0 17.6 9.7 40.0 100.0 0.34
(0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.5) (0.7) - (0.02)
3 0.7 22.7 8.7 17.5 7.6 42.8 100.0 0.27
(0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.3) (0.6) - (0.01)
4 0.7 23.7 9.3 17.3 8.6 40.4 100.0 0.29
(0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.4) (0.7) - (0.01)
5 0.6 25.6 10.0 18.0 10.2 35.5 100.0 0.32
(0.0) (0.5) (0.1) (0.4) (0.5) (1.0) - (0.01)
Enrolled No 1.1 21.1 11.8 18.8 7.2 40.0 100.0 0.23
(0.1) (0.5) (0.3) (0.6) (0.7) (1.0) - (0.02)
Yes 0.2 24.4 8.3 17.2 7.6 42.2 100.0 0.27
(0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.7) (0.9) - (0.02)
Private school No 0.3 23.7 8.2 18.2 5.8 43.8 100.0 0.21
(0.0) (0.2) (0.1) (0.3) (0.4) (0.6) - (0.01)
Yes 0.2 27.0 9.4 15.6 8.9 39.0 100.0 0.28
(0.0) (0.5) (0.2) (0.4) (0.8) (1.3) - (0.02)
All 0.6 25.1 9.1 16.4 11.9 36.9 100.0 0.40
(0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.6) (0.8) - (0.02)
Note: the table reports mixed-effects variance decomposition estimates, based on the unrestricted linear model
representation; standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated via a clustered bootstrap procedure.
Table D4: Sub-group variance decomposition (in std. dev. units ×100), MLM procedure












Female No 0.08 0.50 0.30 0.34 0.41 0.61 1.00 0.39
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Yes 0.08 0.50 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.60 1.00 0.40
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Age group 6-9 0.09 0.51 0.31 0.36 0.40 0.54 0.97 0.42
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
10-13 0.05 0.49 0.29 0.33 0.41 0.66 1.02 0.37
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
SES quintile 1 0.09 0.47 0.29 0.30 0.43 0.64 1.00 0.34
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
2 0.09 0.47 0.29 0.31 0.41 0.62 0.99 0.34
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
3 0.08 0.46 0.28 0.27 0.40 0.63 0.96 0.27
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
4 0.08 0.46 0.29 0.28 0.40 0.61 0.95 0.29
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
5 0.07 0.47 0.29 0.29 0.39 0.55 0.92 0.32
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Enrolled No 0.10 0.46 0.35 0.27 0.44 0.64 1.01 0.23
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Yes 0.05 0.48 0.28 0.27 0.40 0.63 0.97 0.27
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Private school No 0.05 0.46 0.27 0.23 0.41 0.63 0.95 0.21
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Yes 0.04 0.49 0.29 0.28 0.37 0.59 0.94 0.28
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
All 0.08 0.50 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.61 1.00 0.40
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Note: the table reports mixed-effects variance decomposition estimates, based on the unrestricted linear model
representation; standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated via a clustered bootstrap procedure.
Table D5: Regional variance decomposition for Kenya












(a) Absolute contributions (st. dev. units × 100):
Central 0.08 0.39 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.62 0.83 0.38
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Coast 0.09 0.48 0.24 0.27 0.37 0.72 1.01 0.31
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Eastern 0.08 0.45 0.19 0.23 0.35 0.70 0.95 0.32
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
North Eastern 0.08 0.50 0.32 0.37 0.53 0.71 1.13 0.42
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Nyanza 0.08 0.46 0.22 0.23 0.33 0.68 0.95 0.26
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Rift Valley 0.08 0.48 0.24 0.26 0.39 0.75 1.03 0.30
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Western 0.08 0.50 0.22 0.22 0.34 0.70 0.98 0.22
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
All 0.08 0.47 0.22 0.24 0.36 0.73 1.00 0.29
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(b) Relative contributions (percent):
Central 0.8 22.4 3.2 6.5 10.5 56.6 100.0 0.38
(0.0) (0.4) (0.1) (0.5) (0.8) (0.7) - (0.03)
Coast 0.7 22.8 5.6 6.9 13.4 50.6 100.0 0.31
(0.0) (0.8) (0.4) (0.3) (0.9) (1.7) - (0.01)
Eastern 0.7 22.2 3.9 5.8 13.6 53.8 100.0 0.32
(0.0) (0.8) (0.2) (0.3) (0.5) (0.8) - (0.01)
North Eastern 0.6 19.8 7.9 10.5 22.0 39.3 100.0 0.42
(0.0) (0.6) (0.4) (0.7) (0.9) (1.1) - (0.02)
Nyanza 0.8 23.9 5.5 5.9 12.0 52.1 100.0 0.26
(0.0) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6) - (0.01)
Rift Valley 0.6 21.4 5.4 6.4 14.3 51.9 100.0 0.30
(0.0) (0.6) (0.2) (0.4) (0.3) (0.7) - (0.02)
Western 0.7 26.3 5.2 5.2 12.0 50.6 100.0 0.22
(0.0) (0.3) (0.2) (0.1) (0.4) (0.4) - (0.01)
All 0.7 21.7 4.9 5.9 13.1 53.7 100.0 0.29
(0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.6) - (0.01)
Note: the table reports direct fixed-effects variance decomposition estimates, based on the unrestricted
linear model representation; standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated via a clustered bootstrap
procedure.
Table D6: Regional variance decomposition for Tanzania, unrestricted linear model












(a) Absolute contributions (st. dev. units × 100):
Arusha 0.11 0.49 0.19 0.25 0.39 0.70 1.00 0.35
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Dar Es Salaam 0.10 0.45 0.17 0.24 0.36 0.68 0.95 0.38
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Iringa 0.12 0.47 0.21 0.30 0.42 0.67 1.00 0.45
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Kagera 0.13 0.50 0.22 0.30 0.40 0.63 0.98 0.40
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Kigoma 0.14 0.50 0.24 0.33 0.40 0.58 0.96 0.44
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Ruvuma 0.11 0.50 0.15 0.27 0.36 0.65 0.96 0.50
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Singida 0.13 0.49 0.20 0.28 0.42 0.64 0.98 0.41
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Tabora 0.15 0.51 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.63 1.00 0.43
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Tanga 0.12 0.48 0.19 0.28 0.39 0.65 0.96 0.41
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
All 0.13 0.49 0.21 0.29 0.40 0.68 1.00 0.41
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(b) Relative contributions (percent):
Arusha 1.3 23.9 3.5 6.4 15.4 49.6 100.0 0.35
(0.1) (0.7) (0.2) (0.4) (1.1) (1.6) - (0.02)
Dar Es Salaam 1.2 22.8 3.3 6.6 14.6 51.6 100.0 0.38
(0.1) (0.8) (0.3) (0.5) (0.7) (1.7) - (0.02)
Iringa 1.5 22.2 4.4 8.9 17.4 45.5 100.0 0.45
(0.2) (1.0) (0.5) (0.9) (1.0) (2.6) - (0.02)
Kagera 1.9 25.7 5.1 9.3 16.5 41.6 100.0 0.40
(0.2) (0.7) (0.5) (0.9) (0.7) (1.6) - (0.02)
Kigoma 2.1 27.0 6.4 11.5 17.1 35.9 100.0 0.44
(0.2) (1.4) (0.7) (1.1) (1.0) (2.5) - (0.03)
Ruvuma 1.3 26.9 2.5 8.1 14.5 46.8 100.0 0.50
(0.1) (0.9) (0.3) (0.7) (1.0) (1.6) - (0.03)
Singida 1.7 25.2 4.1 8.3 18.4 42.3 100.0 0.41
(0.2) (0.9) (0.5) (1.0) (1.4) (2.2) - (0.02)
Tabora 2.1 25.9 5.6 10.3 16.4 39.7 100.0 0.43
(0.2) (0.7) (0.3) (0.8) (1.2) (1.6) - (0.03)
Tanga 1.6 25.1 3.9 8.2 16.0 45.2 100.0 0.41
(0.2) (1.0) (0.4) (0.6) (1.0) (1.9) - (0.02)
All 1.6 24.0 4.3 8.4 16.0 45.6 100.0 0.41
(0.1) (0.5) (0.2) (0.4) (0.4) (1.2) - (0.01)
Note: the table reports direct fixed-effects variance decomposition estimates, based on the unrestricted
linear model representation; standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated via a clustered bootstrap
procedure; regions have been combined for simplicity (see Appendix C).
Table D7: Regional variance decomposition for Uganda, unrestricted linear model












(a) Absolute contributions (st. dev. units × 100):
Central 0.09 0.43 0.23 0.21 0.35 0.71 0.96 0.22
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Eastern 0.08 0.47 0.22 0.19 0.33 0.68 0.94 0.18
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Northern 0.13 0.48 0.24 0.23 0.37 0.70 0.99 0.22
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Western 0.09 0.49 0.25 0.23 0.38 0.69 0.99 0.23
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
All 0.10 0.47 0.23 0.21 0.36 0.74 1.00 0.21
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
(b) Relative contributions (percent):
Central 0.8 20.3 5.6 4.8 13.1 55.5 100.0 0.22
(0.1) (1.1) (0.4) (0.4) (0.6) (2.2) - (0.01)
Eastern 0.7 25.1 5.2 4.2 12.2 52.5 100.0 0.18
(0.0) (0.5) (0.3) (0.2) (0.6) (0.5) - (0.01)
Northern 1.6 23.2 5.9 5.2 14.1 50.0 100.0 0.22
(0.2) (0.8) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (1.2) - (0.02)
Western 0.8 24.2 6.4 5.6 14.9 48.1 100.0 0.23
(0.1) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.6) - (0.01)
All 0.9 21.8 5.4 4.5 12.7 54.7 100.0 0.21
(0.1) (0.8) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (1.7) - (0.01)
Note: the table reports direct fixed-effects variance decomposition estimates, based on the
unrestricted linear model representation; standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated via a
clustered bootstrap procedure.
E Additional figures
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Persistence
Kenya Tanzania Uganda
Note: lines give the cumulative distribution of estimates for the inequality-constant intergenerational
persistence parameter (see equation 7).
Source: own calculations.
